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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V • 
KORRY BARLOW SMEDLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20020171-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002), where the case was transferred to this Court from the Utah 
Supreme Court. In the underlying case related to this appeal, Appellant Korry Smedley 
was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, first degree felony 
offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(3) (1999). A copy of the judgment is 
attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the trial court erred in 
allowing the state to present evidence of defendant's request for plea discussions. 
Standard of Review: "The question of whether evidence is admissible can be 
either a question of discretion, which we review for abuse of discretion, or a question of 
law, which we review for correctness." State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, |29,44 P.3d 805. 
Once the prosecutor affirmatively presents testimony into evidence, the question of 
admissibility should be reviewed as a question of law. See id. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue in this case is preserved in the record on appeal at 272:182-186; and 
277:78-80, 170-172. See State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, HH18-19, 992P.2d951. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules will be determinative of the issue on appeal: Utah Rules of 
Evidence 401,402,408 and 410 (2002). The text of those provisions is contained in the 
attached Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below. 
In May 2001, the state filed amended charges against Smedley for four counts of 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, first degree felony offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-404.1 (1999). (R. 27-31.) The information alleged that Smedley sexually assaulted 
"K.B., DOB 08/02/91" and "S.B, DOB 01/08/93" on multiple occasions between 
September 1999 and August 2000. (14) 
On September 26, 2001, the trial court commenced the first trial in the matter. (R. 
272; 273.) At the conclusion of the trial, the judge declared a mistrial on the basis that the 
jury was not able to come to a unanimous decision. (R. 273:279-80.) 
On November 27,2001, the trial court commenced a second trial in the case. (R. 
277-78.) That trial resulted in convictions for all counts as charged. (R. 277; 278; 238-
39.) On February 7, 2002, the trial court entered judgment against Smedley, sentencing 
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him to an indeterminate prison term of five years to life for each offense, and to a 
combination of concurrent and consecutive sentences. (R. 240-242.) This appeal 
followed. (R. 247-48.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January 2001, the state charged Smedley with four counts of aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child; the state amended the Information in May. Counts I and II alleged that 
between September 1999 and August 2000, Smedley "touched the anus, genitals, 
buttocks, or breasts" of K.B., whose date of birth was August 2, 1991. (R. 2-4; 27-31; see 
also 225; 226.) Counts III and IV alleged similar conduct with respect to S.B., whose 
date of birth was January 8, 1993. (R. 2-4; 27-31; see also 227; 228.) 
The state's evidence at trial reflected the following. In September 1999, Debra 
Baldwin and her three daughters moved into Smedley's one-bedroom apartment with him. 
Baldwin's daughters were Kaylynn ("K.B."), Savanna ("S.B."), and Isabella. They were 
ages 8, 6, and 5, respectively. (R. 277:91-93.) Baldwin testified that Smedley was 
verbally abusive toward her. However, Smedley had a good relationship with the girls, 
and they cared for each other. The children cared for Smedley like a father. (R. 277:94-
96.) According to Baldwin, Smedley was not verbally abusive toward the girls. (R. 
277:95-96.) 
During the time that Baldwin and Smedley lived together, Smedley worked as a 
painter while Baldwin stayed home with the girls. (R. 277:100, 108.) 
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Baldwin testified that on August 27,2000, she and Smedley had an argument and 
he left the apartment. Baldwin decided that she "was tired of the abuse," and she also 
left with her children. (R. 277:97.) Baldwin took the girls to the bus stop, and after 
approximately 20-30 minutes she decided they would "go home." (R. 277:97.) When 
she told the girls of her plans to return, they "were frantic, they did not want to go back." 
(R. 277:98.) Baldwin asked why, and the girls told her that Smedley was "mean and they 
just didn't want to go back." (R. 277:98, 101.) Baldwin then asked the girls "if he was 
touching them on the private." K.B. and S.B. said yes. (R. 277:98, 102, 104.) 
Baldwin returned to the apartment only to collect her belongings, then she went 
with the girls to her sister's house, where they stayed for a few days. (R. 277:103.) 
When the girls arrived there, they went out to play with their cousin on the trampoline. 
(R. 277:127.) Baldwin did not discuss the "touching" matter with the girls any further. 
She later talked to the police about the allegations. (R. 277:103.) 
Next, S.B. testified at trial. She stated that when she was in the second grade, she 
lived with Smedley in his apartment with her sisters and mother. (R. 277:113-14.) S.B. 
testified that she did not like Smedley because he was "mean" and he touched her "in the 
wrong place." (R. 277:115.) The prosecutor elicited testimony from S.B. that when she 
talked about "the wrong places," S.B. was referring to her buttocks and vagina. (R. 
277:116.) S.B. did not recall when Smedley touched her. (R. 277:116.) 
S.B. testified that she saw Smedley touch K.B. "in the wrong place" while they 
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were in bed in the bedroom of the apartment. (R. 277:116.) S.B. did not know if she 
talked to Smedley about the matter. (R. 277:116-17.) 
S.B. testified that after the incident with K.B., Smedley touched her in the wrong 
place "in the house" and in his big red truck when the two of them were going to the 
store. (R. 277:117.) She testified that Smedley made her rub his penis with lotion 
through his zipper, while his hand was outside her clothing on her vagina. Smedley 
made S.B. rub him until he ejaculated, and he wiped his penis with a tissue. (R. 277:117-
23.) S.B. testified that the touching happened less than five times in the truck. (Id.) 
According to S.B., Smedley also made her touch him and he touched her vagina 
between 5 and 7 times at home under her clothing in the bedroom while her mother was 
home. (R. 277:122-23.) S.B. stated Smedley used lotion that he kept in a bottle in the 
bedroom. (R. 277:124.) According to S.B., after Smedley ejaculated at home, he 
washed his penis in the bathroom while she washed lotion off her hands. (R. 277:124.) 
S.B. testified that she discussed being touched in "the wrong place" with 
prosecutors at least three times and with a detective and a guardian ad litem. (R. 
277:128-29.) S.B. could not remember when the first incident occurred (R. 277:129), or 
any incident thereafter. (R. 277:130.) 
K.B. also testified at trial. She stated she was eight when her family moved into 
Smedley's apartment. (R. 277:145.) During that time, K.B. called Smedley "Dad" and 
she felt like he was her father. (R. 277:136.) According to K.B., she and her sisters slept 
5 
in the living room, while Smedley and Baldwin slept in the bedroom. (R. 277:135-36.) 
K.B. testified that Smedley touched her in 'the wrong place" "a lot" and Smedley 
made her touch him "a few times." (R. 277:137, 158.) According to K.B., the first time 
Smedley touched her, "we like came into his house one day and we had a big group hug 
and then he reached down my pants and touched me" while her mother and sisters were 
there. (R. 277:150 (K.B. responded "Uh-huh" when defense counsel asked if K.B.'s 
mother was there; compare that to R. at 277:139 where "Huh-uh" means "no"; and to 
277:145, where K.B. answers "Uh-huh" when asked if her sister's name is Isabella).) 
Also, according to K.B., Smedley rubbed her vagina with his fingers while they 
were in the living room with the other girls watching television, and Baldwin was 
sleeping. (R. 277:137-38.) While K.B. originally testified that Smedley touched her 
when they were in the living room, she later testified that he also touched her in the 
bedroom. (R. 277:138,156.) 
K.B. recalled one occasion when Smedley touched her. She stated that she and 
her sisters were watching "PB and J Otter" in the living room on a Saturday or Sunday, 
and she was sitting beside S.B. and Smedley. (R. 277:156-57.) 
K.B. also testified that while she was in the truck with Smedley, he would offer to 
buy K.B. "treats and stuff if K.B. would rub his penis with lotion. (R. 277:140-41.) 
K.B. testified that Smedley would ejaculate then wipe his penis with a napkin. (R. 
277:141.) According to K.B., S.B. occasionally was sitting in the truck with them in the 
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backseat. (R. 277:142,151-52.) When K.B. was asked to tell the jury about Smedley's 
conduct in the truck, she stated she did not remember. (R. 277:152.) 
K.B. testified that she spoke with various people on five or six different occasions 
about being touched in "the wrong place." (R. 277:148.) 
Detective Kathleen Rackley also testified for the state. She spoke with K.B. and 
S.B. after their mother reported the alleged abuse. (R. 277:165.) According to Rackley, 
the children's testimony was similar to what they told her during interviews in September 
2000. (R. 277:167.) Rackley also testified that during her investigation, she learned that 
Smedley and the girls had a good relationship with each other, and the girls seemed 
unaffected by the alleged abuse. (R. 277:206.) 
Rackley testified that she and a second officer spoke with Smedley. (R. 277:168.) 
She stated that Smedley waived his rights per Miranda and agreed to speak with the 
officers about the girls' allegations. (R. 277:169.) During the interrogation, Smedley 
denied any sexual or inappropriate contact with the girls. (R. 277:170.) 
Over defense counsel's pretrial objections (R. 277:78-79), Rackley testified that 
Smedley "wanted to know what - you know, what kind of deal he could get if he pled 
guilty, you know, exactly what the penalty would be. If he were to plead guilty, what 
would he get." (R. 277:170-71.) Rackley testified that Smedley asked several times 
about a deal if he pled. "He kept asking what kind of a deal could he get, How long am I 
looking at?" (R. 277:171.) The officers informed Smedley that they "don't make deals 
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with people." (R. 277:171.) When the prosecutor asked the detective why Smedley 
"wanted to make a deal" if the allegations were untrue, the detective answered, "He did 
mention that, he didn't want the girls to have to testify, but he just needed to know what 
kind of penalties this would come with before he would, you know, talk to us any 
further." (R. 277:172.) 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Smedley as charged. He is appealing 
from the final judgment. Additional facts related to this appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Over defense counsel's objections, the state presented evidence at trial that during 
a police interrogation, Smedley inquired into a plea "deal." Smedley was interested in 
entering into a deal in order to protect the girls from having to testify at a criminal trial. 
The trial court erred in admitting the testimony into evidence. The testimony violated 
Rules 401,402,408 and 410, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Specifically, evidence of "compromise negotiations" and plea discussions is 
inadmissible under Rules 408 and 410 because such evidence is irrelevant and does not 
constitute an admission of guilt. Likewise, such evidence is inadmissible for public 
policy reasons. Where plea discussions are encouraged between parties, the admission of 
such evidence at trial would undermine the benefits achieved through use of the 
negotiation process. 
Also, the evidence in this case was inadmissible under the relevancy rules. It did 
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not have any bearing on any element of the crimes charged, and it did not make the fact 
that Smedley otherwise denied the alleged abuse more or less probable, particularly since 
he sought a plea deal for the benefit of the children: he did not want them to have to go 
through the trauma of testifying at trial. Smedley's reasons for seeking a plea deal were 
legitimate and should not have been used in a way to suggest guilt. As further set forth 
below, the inadmissible evidence prejudiced Smedley and denied him a fair trial in the 
matter. Smedley respectfully requests that this Court reverse the convictions in this case 
and remand the matter for a new trial, excluding the inadmissible evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING STATEMENTS INTO 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING SMEDLEY'S PLEA DISCUSSIONS, 
A. THE STATEMENTS WERE INADMISSIBLE UNDER THE UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE. 
m Utah Rules of Evidence 408 and 410. 
Rule 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states the following: 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any 
civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea 
or was a participant in the plea discussions: 
* * * 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the 
prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a 
plea of guilty later withdrawn. 
Utah R. Evid. 410 (2002) (emphasis added). Rule 408 likewise provides that statements 
made in "compromise negotiations" are inadmissible. Utah R. Evid. 408 (2002). 
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Rules 408 and 410 apply in both civil and criminal cases. See Utah R. Evid. 101 
(2002) (the rules of evidence govern proceedings in the courts of this State); id. at 102 
(rules shall be construed to secure fairness and "promotion of growth and development 
of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined"); State v. Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 583 and n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(applying Rule 410, and also citing U.S. v. Verdoorn. 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1976), 
for the proposition that "under the rationale of Fed R. Evid. 408, which relates to the 
general inadmissibility of compromises and offers to compromise, government proposals 
concerning pleas should be excludable" (emphasis added)). 
According to the plain language of Rule 410, it excludes evidence of "plea" 
discussions. See State v. Redd. 1999 UT 108,1J11, 992 P.2d 986 (court construes 
provision according its plain language). Plea discussions include "even an attempt to 
open plea bargaining." See Fed. R. Crim P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes, Note to 
Subdivision (e)(6); U.S. v. Brooks. 536 F.2d 1137, 1139 (6th Cir. 1976). That is, 
statements made in an effort to initiate a plea deal fall within the definition of "plea" 
discussions under the rules. See Brooks. 536 F.2d at 1139. 
While "plea discussions" logically occur only in criminal cases, Rule 410 
specifically excludes evidence of "plea discussions" in both criminal and civil cases. 
Subsection (4) provides that such statements are inadmissible in evidence "in any civil or 
criminal proceeding" if they were made "in the course of plea discussions with an 
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attorney for the prosecuting authority." Utah R. Evid. 410(4) (2002). 
In determining whether a defendant's statements to government agents regarding a 
"plea" deal are excludable under Rule 410(4), federal courts have applied a two-tiered 
test. The test considers, first, whether the defendant "exhibited an actual subjective 
expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion," and second, whether the 
defendant's "expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective 
circumstances." U.S. v. Conawav. 11 F.3d 40,42 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying two-tiered 
test to evaluate whether statements must be excluded under Rule 410); U.S. v. Guerrero. 
847 F.2d 1363,1367 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A statement was made in the course of plea 
discussions if: (1) the suspect exhibited an actual subjective expectation that he was 
negotiating a plea at the time of the discussion; and (2) the suspect's expectation was 
reasonable given the totality of the circumstances"). 
Although the language of Rule 410(4) excludes statements from evidence made in 
the course of discussions "with an attorney for the prosecuting authority," federal courts 
have not required proof that the discussions were with an attorney for the prosecution 
or an agent with actual authority before applying the rule to exclude the evidence. U.S. 
v. Swidan. 689 F.Supp. 726, 728 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (rejecting the argument that only 
discussions with the prosecuting attorney or his authorized agents are excluded under the 
rule). 
In fact, federal courts have ruled that if Rule 410 were to apply only when the 
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government agent had actual authority to negotiate a plea, that would create an unfair 
trap for the unwary defendant since he generally interacts with officers, who are engaged 
in calculated interrogation. See U.S. v. Bridges. 46 F.Supp.2d 462, 465-66 and n. 12-13 
(E.D. Va. 1999), afFd, 217 F.3d 841 (4th Cir. 2000). If the defendant were required to 
prove "actual authority," a law enforcement agent "need only propose to relay any offers 
to the prosecuting attorney, and thus preserve the government's freedom to choose to 
enter into plea discussions or to use the statements against the accused. This does not 
protect the plea discussion process." Swidan. 689 F.Supp. at 728. Also, such tactics 
would be unfair to the defendant. 
The plain language of Rule 408 also supports that it applies in criminal cases. 
Rule 408 excludes the admissibility of evidence of "conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations." Utah R. Evid. 408 (2002). Since "compromise negotiations" 
occur in both civil and criminal cases, the rule applies with equal force in both situations. 
Indeed, Rule 408 specifically excludes evidence of negotiations in cases except 
when the evidence is offered to show bias or prejudice, to rebut a claim of "undue delay," 
or to prove obstruction in a "criminal investigation or prosecution." Utah R. Evid. 408. 
Since the rule does not apply in certain circumstances identified in the rule {e.g. to prove 
obstruction in a criminal case), it must be construed otherwise to apply in criminal cases 
to exclude plea statements relating to the charge at bar. Stated another way, this Court 
will not interpret Rule 408 in a manner that renders the exceptions inoperative; it will not 
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interpret the provision to apply only in civil cases, since that would render the specifically 
articulated exception (e.g. to prove obstruction in a criminal case) to the rule to be 
superfluous. See Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corr.. 2001 UT 34,^ 15,24 P.3d 958 (stating 
court will "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative"). 
Also, Rule 408 has been interpreted to apply only to plea discussions and 
negotiations occurring in the case at bar. See Pearson. 818 P.2d at 582-84 & n.4 
(applying Rule 410 to plea discussions that occurred in the criminal case at bar, and 
recognizing application of Rule 408); see also Broadcort Capital Corp. v. Summa Medical 
Corp.. 972 F.2d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Rule 408 only bars admission of evidence 
relating to settlement discussions if that evidence is offered to prove 'liability for or 
invalidity of the claim or its amount.' Here, the evidence related to an entirely different 
claim - the evidence was not admitted to prove the validity or amount of the 'claim under 
negotiation"9) (cite omitted).1 
Finally, Rules 408 and 410 are supported by public policy concerns. See Shriver v. 
State. 632 P.2d 420,426 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (recognizing that even without a statute 
1 Generally, evidence of settlement negotiations that took place in a different case or 
claim will be admissible at trial in the case at bar. See 2 Jack Weinstein & Margaret 
Berger, Weinstein's Evdience, H 408 at 408-32 to 408-33 (1991) (where the settlement 
negotiations and terms are part of another dispute, they must be admitted in evidence); 
see also State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58,ffl|44-46, 27 P.3d 1115 (finding that Rule 408 does 
not serve to bar statements in a criminal trial that were made during civil negotiations 
between private parties). 
13 
making plea negotiation statements inadmissible, such statements should be protected 
from disclosure at trial). In considering application of Rule 410, this Court in State v. 
Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, stated that public policy precludes the admission into evidence of 
"plea discussions in which the defendant participated." Id at 583. Plea bargaining is 
essential to the criminal justice system and should be encouraged. Fairness dictates that 
plea discussions between defendant and the prosecution should be excluded from 
evidence. See KL at 582-83; see also State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984) 
(recognizing that police officers are part of the government's prosecution team); Barbee 
v. Warden. Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964). 
Thus, public policy makes evidence of negotiations and plea discussions 
inadmissible under Rules 408 and 410 for the following reasons: First, the evidence is 
irrelevant. See Pearson, 818 P.2d at 584 n.6 (seriously questioning the relevancy of such 
evidence); Fed. R. Evid. 408, Advisory Committee Note (such evidence ,fis irrelevant, 
since the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of 
weakness of position"): see State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313,1317 (Utah 1986) (where Utah 
rules were modeled after federal rules, Utah courts will look to federal law to aid in 
interpreting the Utah provisions). 
Second, such discussions do not constitute an admission of liability. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 408, Advisory Committee Note ("As a matter of general agreement, evidence of an 
offer to compromise a claim is not receivable in evidence as an admission of, as the case 
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may be, the validity or invalidity of the claim"); see also Gray. 717 P.2d at 1317 (in 
construing rules of evidence Utah courts will look to federal law). 
Pursuant to Rules 408 and 410(4), the state's evidence at trial that Smedley 
requested plea negotiations was inadmissible. The evidence should have been excluded 
from trial, as further explained below. See infra, subpart A.(3), herein. 
(2) The Relevancy Rules 401 and 402. 
Rules 401 and 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, provide that "relevant evidence" is 
that which has a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401 (2002). "Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402 (2002); see. also id. at 403 (although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if it is unduly prejudicial or will mislead the jury). In Pearson, this 
Court "seriously questioned] whether plea negotiations are relevant evidence [under 
rules 401 and 402] in a criminal prosecution. The negotiation strategy and positioning of 
either the defense or the prosecution is not evidence of the elements of the crime 
charged." Pearson. 818 P.2d at 584 n.6. 
Pursuant to Rules 401 and 402, the state's evidence at trial that Smedley requested 
plea negotiations in this matter should have been excluded as irrelevant, as further 
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explained below. See infra, subpart A.(3), herein.2 
(3) The Statements at Trial 
In this case, the trial court improperly allowed the state to admit evidence of 
2 Under the case law, it is irrelevant that the defendant waived his right to counsel and to 
remain silent under Miranda when he requested plea discussions. The plea discussions are 
inadmissible under the rules of evidence. 
In the present case, the evidence shows that the detectives administered standard 
Miranda warnings, informing the defendant that he had a right to remain silent and 
that anything he said could be used against him in court. The state contends that 
the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights also constituted a knowing waiver of 
the protections of Rules 410 and 11(e)(6). We disagree. Miranda warnings 
sufficiently apprise defendants of their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. In 
addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that Miranda warnings 
sufficiently inform defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel such that 
a subsequent waiver is knowing. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285,293-94, 108 
S.Ct. 2389, 2395, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988). The Court determined that by "telling 
[Patterson] that he had a right to consult with an attorney, to have a lawyer present 
while he was questioned, and even to have a lawyer appointed for him if he could 
not afford to retain one on his own, [this] conveyed to [Patterson] the sum and 
substance of the rights that the Sixth Amendment provided him" such that his 
subsequent waiver was knowing. Id. Miranda warnings specifically inform 
defendants that they have the right to remain silent and the right to have an 
attorney present. Thus, Miranda warnings serve to make defendants aware of those 
specific rights. However, Miranda warnings do not mention the rights provided 
by Rules 410 and 11(e)(6). Thus, the warnings cannot make a defendant fully 
aware of the nature of the rights provided by Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) such that a 
waiver of Miranda rights is also a knowing waiver of the rights provided by the 
rules. See generally Roberts v. Commonwealth, 896 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Ky.1995) 
(though not discussing waiver, the court held that statements made by a defendant 
during plea discussions were inadmissible pursuant to Kent. R. Evid. 410, and the 
defendant had been advised only of his Miranda rights prior to discussions); 
Barnett v. State, 725 So.2d 797, 801 (Miss. 1998) (though not addressing waiver, 
the court held that Rule 410 prohibited the use of the defendant's statements made 
during plea discussions after the defendant had been given Miranda warnings). 
State v.Hinton. 42 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tenn. 2001). 
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Smedley's plea discussions. The statements were inadmissible under the two-tiered test 
adopted by federal courts for application of Rule 410, and/or they were inadmissible 
under Rules 408,401, and 402. 
To begin the analysis under the facts of this case, during trial, the prosecutor 
engaged in the following examination of Detective Rackley: 
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Then what did he say? 
[DETECTIVE RACKLEY]: He denied that [he engaged in any improper sexual 
contact with the girls] and then he wanted to know what - you know, what kind of 
deal he could get if he pled guilty, you know, exactly what the penalty would be. 
If he were to plead guilty, what would he get. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Did you ever tell him of any charges? 
[DETECTIVE RACKLEY]: No. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Were there any charges at that point? 
[DETECTIVE RACKLEY]: No. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Did you ever discuss with him penalties or punishment? 
[DETECTIVE RACKLEY]: No. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Did you ever bring up with him that you wanted to make a deal 
or could make a deal with him? 
[DETECTIVE RACKLEY]: No. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Did you ever talk to him about it was maybe in his best interest 
or not to work with you? 
[DETECTIVE RACKLEY]: No. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. How may times did he tell you that he wanted to know 
what kind of deal he could get if he pled guilty? 
[DETECTIVE RACKLEY]: Several times. He kept asking what kind of a deal 
could he get, How long as I looking at? 
[PROSECUTOR]: And what would your response to him ? 
[DETECTIVE RACKLEY]: Well, Detective Roberts, I remember him answering 
too. He was like, we don't make deals with people, that's not our job, that's not 
our position. We want to talk about the case, we want to know, you know, what 
happened. We want to get his side of the story. 
Well, I need to know what kind of, you know, charges I'm looking at. I 
need to know what kind of time and penalty I'm looking at. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Did he ever say why he wanted to take a deal if he denied the 
allegations? 
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[DETECTIVE RACKLEY]: Why he wanted to take a deal? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Uh-huh. 
PETECTIVE RACKLEY]: Not that I recall. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Did he ever tell you anything about the girls having to testify or 
not? 
PETECTIVE RACKLEY]: He did mention that, he didn't want the girls to have 
to testify, but he just needed to know what kind of penalties this would come with 
before he would, you know talk to us any further. 
(R. 277:170-72.) 
Notwithstanding defense counsel's pretrial objections to the testimony about a plea 
deal, the trial court allowed the testimony on the basis that the evidence was relevant and 
reflected an admission of guilt.3 The ruling is directly contrary to policy considerations 
3 During the first trial, the defense objected to the detective's testimony about a pos-
sible fldealfton the grounds that the testimony was irrelevant and did not constitute an 
admission that could be used against Smedley under Miranda. (R. 272:182-86.) Also, 
according to counsel, Smedley's inquiry into plea negotiations constituted a "typical 
question that detectives talk with clients a lot about, whether or not they'll go easier on 
them if they talk now and that sort of thing. It's not an admission of guilt." (R. 272:185-
86; see also id. at 182-83.) That objection properly preserved the issue for appeal. It 
implicated the policy considerations underlying Rules 408 and 410, and the relevancy 
objection specifically implicated Rules 401 and 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. See supra. 
subpart A.(l) and (2), herein. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the state 
to elicit testimony from Detective Rackley that Smedley requested a plea deal. (R. 
272:186.) 
At the second trial, defense counsel renewed his objection to that particular line of 
questioning during pretrial proceedings. (R. 277:78-79.) In response to the objection, 
the prosecutor stated that "[a]s before" the evidence was relevant and admissible. He 
claimed that it was an admission of guilt. (R. 277:79-80.) The trial judge asked the 
prosecutor if he intended to use the statements as an admission, and when the prosecutor 
said yes, the judge noted the objection for the record and proceeded as before, declining 
to reconsider his earlier ruling on the matter. (R. 277:80.) Thereafter, in light of the trial 
court's ruling during the first trial and its refusal to reconsider the matter in connection 
with the second trial, the state questioned the detective about the plea negotiations. (R. 
277:171-72); see Saunders. 1999 UT 59, ffl[18-19 (ruling that once a defendant makes a 
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prohibiting the admissibility of such evidence under Rules 408 and 410, and it was 
improper under Rules 401,402 and 403.4 
In considering exclusion of the evidence under Rule 410, this Court should adopt 
the two-tiered test used by federal courts, as set forth above. See supra, subpart A.(l), 
herein. That test contains a subjective component and an objective component. The 
Court first will consider whether the defendant exhibited an actual, subjective expectation 
to negotiate a plea at the time in question, and second, whether the defendant's 
motion before trial to exclude evidence, the issue is properly preserved and the defendant 
is not required to further object to the matter at trial). 
During closing argument, defense counsel made reference to the inadmissible 
statements and urged the jury to find that they did not support guilt. (R. 278:251.) That 
was appropriate under the law, given the way in which the trial court ruled on the matter, 
and the fact that defense counsel had no other choice but to proceed with the case in light 
of that ruling. See S.L.C. v. Holtman. 806 P.2d 235, 237 and n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(identifying federal cases that support once the trial court has ruled on an 
objection/motion, it is properly preserved; where defense counsel then had no choice but 
to proceed in light of the ruling does not constitute waiver or invited error); State v. 
Burns. 2000 UT 56, ^ [20,4 P.3d 795 (recognizing that trial court ruling left defendant 
with no choice but to proceed in light of ruling; that does not constitute a waiver of the 
issue on appeal). 
4 In the event the prosecutor in this case actually intended to present the evidence of plea 
discussions to support that Smedley intended to protect the girls from having to testify at 
trial, the statements in that instance would be presented for "the truth of the matter 
asserted." See Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (2002). Also, the statements plainly in that instance 
would not constitute an admission of guilt. Thus, the statements would be inadmissible 
under the hearsay rules. Utah R. Evid. 801, 802 (2002). In the event that is what the 
prosecutor intended to communicate with the statements in this case, the prosecutor 
presented the evidence in such a way so as to confuse the jury and to unfairly prejudice 
Smedley, by also suggesting that the statements supported an admission. In that regard, 
the statements also were inadmissible under Rule 403, Utah R. Evid. (2002). 
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expectation of such was reasonable given the circumstances. See Conaway, 11 F.3d at 
42. 
Under the first prong, Smedley exhibited an actual, subjective intent to negotiate a 
plea at the time in question. Detective Rackley testified here that after Smedley denied 
any wrong doing, he wanted to talk about a plea deal with the officers. (R. 277:170.) 
Rackley did not tell Smedley what the charges would be, she did not discuss penalties or 
punishment, and she did not state whether she wanted to make a deal or could make a 
deal with Smedley. (R. 277:171.) According to Rackley, Smedley told her "[s]everal 
times" that he wanted to discuss a plea deal. "He kept asking what kind of a deal could 
he get, How long am I looking at?" (R. 277:171.) 
Thereafter, a second officer, Detective Roberts, advised Smedley that "[w]e don't 
make deals with people, that's not our job, that's not our position." (R. 277:171.) 
According to the record, once the officers made that statement to Smedley, he did not 
make any further comment about a plea "deal." (See R. 277:171-72.) 
Rackley also disclosed that Smedley wanted to make a deal so that the girls would 
not have to testify at trial. (R. 277:171-72.) He did not want them to have to go through 
the trauma of a trial. 
The evidence supports that Smedley reasonably believed he was able to discuss a 
plea with the officers. He requested a "deal" several times with the officers and he 
reasonably believed he could have such discussions with them until the officers informed 
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him otherwise. (R. 277:171.) Up until the time the officers informed Smedley that they 
do not make deals, his belief that they could negotiate was reasonable, not only for a lay 
person, but also under the law. See Shabata. 678 P.2d at 788 (recognizing that in the 
prosecution, police officers are part of the government's prosecution team); Barbee, 331 
F.2d at 846. 
Indeed, according to the detective, Smedley's discussions about a plea continued 
until he was informed that the officers would not "deal." (R. 277:171.) Thereafter, 
Smedley did not engage in further discussions about a plea deal with the detectives. That 
is, once Smedley was told otherwise, his actions reflect that he had no interest in talking 
any further with the detectives about the matter. The first prong of the two-tiered test is 
established. In this case, Smedley exhibited an actual, subjective intent to negotiate a plea 
at the time in question. That intent was reasonable since Smedley was not advised 
initially that the detectives would not entertain a "deal." 
Under the second prong of the test, the Court will consider whether the defen-
dant's expectation was reasonable given the total circumstances. In this matter, Smedley's 
expectation was reasonable up to the point when the detectives revealed they would not or 
could not entertain plea discussions with him. (R. 277:171-72.) At that point, Smedley 
discontinued the talks. (Id.) Thus, the statements were reasonably made by Smedley to 
initiate a deal. Such statements constitute a plea discussion under the law, Brooks. 536 
F.2d at 1139 (statements made in an effort to initiate a plea deal fall within the definition 
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of plea discussions), and must be deemed inadmissible under the rules of evidence. 
Even if this Court narrowly interpreted Rule 410(4) and required proof that the 
plea discussions be with an "attorney for the prosecuting authority" before such evidence 
may be excludable, this Court should find that the discussions here were with an actual 
agent of the attorney, satisfying that factor, as follows. 
First, it is plain in this case, that Rackley was an agent of the prosecutor. Rackley 
communicated Smedley's interest in a plea to the prosecutor, as supported by the fact that 
the prosecutor was aware of the discussions prior to trial. (See R. 272:182-83 (record in-
dicates parties were aware of officer's testimony about a plea "deal" before the officer 
provided such testimony).) In addition, the prosecutor then offered a "deal" to Smedley. 
(R. 275:7 (defense discloses prior to trial that prosecutor offered to settle the matter for a 
plea on two first degree offenses).) The record supports that Smedley's statements served 
to initiate plea discussions "with an attorney for the prosecuting authority," Utah R. Evid. 
410(4), where a member of the prosecution team (the detective) communicated Smedley's 
interests to the State prosecutor, and the prosecutor then made an offer. 
Second, as stated above, under Utah law, an officer is a member of the prosecuting 
team. Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788. Thus, Smedley's statements regarding a plea deal were 
made to a member of the prosecution team in this case. That is sufficient to implicate 
application of Rule 410(4) and the exclusionary rule set forth therein. 
Finally, in the event this Court is not persuaded that the federal two-tiered test is 
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sufficient under Rule 410(4), and/or this Court requires additional evidence to support 
that Detective Rackley was an agent of the prosecuting attorney for application of that 
provision, it should nevertheless find that the statements here were inadmissible. This 
Court should find that the statements were excludable under Rule 408. That rule 
excludes "compromise negotiations" from evidence, and does not contain the same 
language as Rule 410(4) that negotiations be "with an attorney" to trigger application of 
the rule. Thus, Rule 408 should apply in this case to suppress plea discussions between 
the defendant and a governmental officer. 
Since Rules 410 and 408 serve some of the same policy considerations, see supra, 
subpart A.(l), as a guide this Court may apply the federal two-tiered test set forth above 
(for application of Rule 410(4)) to determine whether statements must be excluded from 
evidence under Rule 408. That is, under Rule 408, this Court should assess, first, whether 
the defendant "exhibited an actual subjective expectation" to engage in compromise 
negotiations at the time in question, and second, whether the defendant's "expectation 
was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances." Conaway, 11 F.3d at 
42; Pearson, 818 P.2d at 583 n. 4 (citing Verdoorn, 528 F.2d at 107, for the proposition 
that "under the rationale of Fed. R. Evid. 408, which relates to the general inadmissibility 
of compromises and offers to compromise," plea discussions in criminal cases should be 
excludable). 
To that end, as set forth above (supra, pages 19-21, herein), under the federal two-
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tiered analysis, the statements in this case were inadmissible. Thus, this Court should find 
that the statements should have been suppressed under Rule 408. The trial court erred in 
failing to exclude Detective Rackley's testimony from evidence regarding Smedley's plea 
discussions. 
Also, the evidence in this case is inadmissible under Rules 401 and 402. Rules 
401 and 402 provide that to be relevant, evidence must have a tendency "to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401 
(2002). Also, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Id. at 402. 
In Pearson. 818 P.2d 581, this Court stated that "[significant issues of public 
policy" support the position that "evidence of plea discussions in which the defendant 
participated should not be admissible either against or in favor of the defendant." Id at 
583. Also, "[p]lea bargaining is an essential component of the criminal justice system, 
and as such, is sanctioned by the Utah Rules of Evidence." Id. at 582. Plea discussions 
are encouraged by the courts, and fairness dictates that such discussions should not be 
admitted into evidence. Id at 583. This Court also stated that under Rule 401 or 402, 
"we seriously question whether plea negotiations are relevant evidence in a criminal 
prosecution. The negotiation strategy and positioning of either the defense or the 
prosecution is not evidence of the elements of the crime charged." Id at 584 n.6. 
In this case, the state expressed that it intended to introduce evidence of Smedley's 
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plea requests to establish an admission of guilt for the sexual offenses. Yet, legal 
authority supports that plea discussions do not constitute an admission of guilt (Fed. R. 
Evid. 408, Advisory Committee Note), and in fact in this case, Smedley was not 
requesting a plea deal for that reason. The record shows that Smedley sought such a deal 
in order to protect the girls from having to testify at trial. His request for a plea was for 
the benefit of the girls. (R. 277:171-72.) 
Smedley's statements about a plea "deal" were irrelevant. Utah R. Evid. 401 & 
402. Those statements did not make the state's allegations of improper sexual contact 
either more probable or less probable, particularly where Smedley's reasons for seeking a 
deal related to protecting the girls from the stress of trial. The statements did not establish 
any element of the crimes. The evidence did not support an admission on Smedley's part. 
See supra, subpart A.(l) (policy reasons for excluding evidence of "plea" discussions is 
that such evidence does not constitute an admission). And the evidence did not shed any 
light on Smedley's reasons for denying the allegations to the extent the state believed 
those denials to be untrue. 
In short, the evidence in this case was not used for any relevant purpose. The 
statements about a plea "deal" were irrelevant under Rules 401, 402 and Pearson. Also, 
the state's purpose for admitting the plea requests into evidence stood at direct odds with 
the policy considerations underlying Rules 408 and 410(4). The trial court erred in admit-
ting the statements into evidence. The error was harmful to Smedley, as set forth below. 
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B. THE STATEMENTS PREJUDICED SMEDLEY. 
The Utah Supreme Court has specified that under a prejudice analysis," [i]f, in the 
absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for defendant, we must reverse the conviction." State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 
388, 407-408 (Utah 1989); State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (in 
assessing prejudice, this Court will consider the case absent the evidence that was 
wrongfully admitted). 
In assessing prejudice in this case, this Court will consider the strength of the 
state's evidence presented at trial. If the case hinges on a determination of credibility, 
this Court will be more likely to find that inadmissible evidence was prejudicial. 
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 407-08. 
This case hinged on credibility. To find Smedley guilty of 4 counts of first degree 
sexual abuse of a child, the jury was required to believe the girls' vague claims that 
Smedley touched them in a "wrong place" over the course of a year, while their mother 
was close by in the one-bedroom apartment. Also, the jury was required to believe that 
when Smedley allegedly improperly touched the girls, other members of the family were 
present. Yet, none of the claims of improper touching were corroborated by witnesses. 
Indeed, in this case, the state's only evidence of alleged abuse came in the form of 
testimony from S.B. and K.B. Both girls used the same terminology when describing the 
matter; both girls testified that they talked to several people about the alleged contact; and 
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both girls repeatedly testified that they did not remember details about the alleged abuse 
when they were asked specific questions by the defense. (See R. 277:115,125-32,137, 
148-53, 157-58.) As demonstrated in the first trial of this case, the vague testimony left 
jurors with reasonable doubt. (R. 273:278-80.) 
Also, although S.B. and K.B. both testified that their mother was in the apartment 
when the alleged abuse occurred (R. 277:123, 150), Baldwin did not observe any unusual 
behavior between Smedley and her daughters. (R. 277:94-96, 99-100.) In fact, according 
to Baldwin, Smedley and her daughters had a good relationship. (Id.) Also, in this case, 
Rackley testified that Smedley denied any abuse. Thus, the case came down to the girls' 
testimony against Smedley's denials. 
In other contexts, Utah appellate courts have refused to find "harmless" error 
where the evidence on a critical issue is circumstantial, or where the jury was required to 
resolve conflicts in the evidence. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 407-08; State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 
532, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Statev.Trov. 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Andreason, 718 P.2d 400,403 (Utah 1986) (when the evidence in the record is 
circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, court is less likely to find harmless error). 
In this case, the evidence required the jury to resolve conflicts and draw 
conclusions where there were vague allegations. The jurors may have been searching for 
some reason beyond the girls' testimony to believe that abuse occurred. The state's 
evidence that Smedley was willing to negotiate a plea may have provided jurors with that 
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reason, or it may have allowed the jurors to justify the convictions in this case where they 
were aware that he was willing at one time to pay a price even while he maintained his 
innocence. 
In seeking to make some sense of the irrelevant information concerning Smedley's 
willingness to bargain with the state, and the girls' unsubstantiated and vague reports of 
abuse, the jurors likely were unduly influenced by the evidence of the plea discussions. 
In that regard the inadmissible evidence influenced the jurors' verdict in this matter and 
violated Smedley's right to a fair trial. A reasonable likelihood exists that if the state had 
been prohibited from admitting testimony of the plea discussions into evidence, Smedley 
would have been acquitted of the charges in this case. On that basis, this Court must 
reverse the convictions and remand the case for a new trial, where the state would be 
precluded from admitting the statements into evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Smedley respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this /1*dav of IL^JU^L 2 0 0 2-
LINDA M. JONES U 
DAVID FINLAYSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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KORRY BARLOW SMEDLEY, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
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Reporter: TRIPP, DOROTHY 
Prosecutor: BOWN, GREGORY L. 
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Defendant»s Attorney(s): FINLAYSON, DAVID V 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 26, 1958 
Video 
Tape Number: Video Tape Count: 10:29 
CHARGES 
AGGRAVATED 
Plea: Not 
AGGRAVATED 
Plea: Not 
AGGRAVATED 
Plea: Not 
AGGRAVATED 
Plea: Not 
SEX ABUSE 
Guilty 
SEX ABUSE 
Guilty -
SEX ABUSE 
Guilty -
SEX ABUSE 
Guilty -
OF A CHILD -
Disposition: 
OF A CHILD -
Disposition: 
OF A CHILD -
Disposition: 
OF A CHILD -
Disposition: 
1st Degree 
11/28/2002 
1st Degree 
11/28/2002 
1st Degree 
11/28/2002 
1st Degree 
11/28/2002 
Felony 
Guilty 
Felony 
Guilty 
Felony 
Guilty 
Felony 
Guilty 
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Case No: 011900112 
Date: Feb 04, 2002 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED SEX ABUSE OF A 
CHILD a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED SEX ABUSE OF A 
CHILD a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED SEX ABUSE OF A 
CHILD a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED SEX ABUSE OF A 
CHILD a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts 1 & 2 to run concurrent to each other and consecutive to 
counts 3 & 4. Counts 3 & 4 to run concurrent with each other. 
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ADDENDUM B 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
s tatute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting 
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its 
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations 
is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any 
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of 
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the 
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a 
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct 
a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Rule 410. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and 
related statements. 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in 
any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made 
the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: 
( D a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2) a plea of nolo contendere; 
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure 
regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney 
for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which 
result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. 
However, such LI statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein 
another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has 
been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contempo-
raneously with it, or (iv in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement 
if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record and in 
